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We present results from a study about women and employee-elected board members, and fill 
some of the gaps in the literature about their contribution to board effectiveness. The 
empirical data is from a unique data set of Norwegian firms. Board effectiveness is evaluated 
in relation to board control tasks including board CSR involvement. We found that the 
contributions of women and employee-elected board members varied depending on the board 
tasks studied. In the article we also explored the effects of the esteem of the women and 
employee-elected board members, and we used creative discussions in the boardroom as a 
mediating variable. Previous board research, including research about women and employee-
elected directors, questions if the board members contribute to board effectiveness. The main 
message from this study is that it may be more important to ask how, rather than if, women 
and employee-elected board members contribute, and we need to open the black box of actual 
board behavior to explore how they may contribute. 
 
KEY WORDS: Boards of directors, CSR, women directors, employee-elected directors, board 
control tasks, esteem, creative discussions 
 
 
Accepted for publication in Journal of Business Ethics 18.11.2008 




Women and employee-elected board members and their contributions to board 
control tasks 
 
The recent crisis in confidence in large corporations has given renewed attention to corporate 
social responsibility (CSR), corporate governance, and the composition and roles of boards of 
directors (Kochan, 2003; Schwartz, Dunfee and Klein, 2005). In the present corporate 
governance and CSR debates the inclusion of women and employee-elected members on 
corporate boards is often suggested. The question driving our research is how diversity 
contributes to board effectiveness. Evidence from Norway will be presented. 
 
This article contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it contributes to the ongoing 
discussion about corporate governance innovations with a focus on CSR perspectives. The 
CSR perspectives are related to board involvement in CSR issues, and the use of women and 
employee-elected board members. Second, it contributes to understanding how women and 
employee-elected board members may contribute to board effectiveness. Third, the article 
contributes to understanding diversity and board processes in relation to board effectiveness 
and task performance. The overall conclusion in this study is that it is more important to 
explore how rather than if women and employee-elected board members may contribute to 
board effectiveness.  
 
Need for diversity on boards 
The main argument promoting women and employee-elected board members from a business 
case perspective has been that diversity is important for corporate value creation. To 
understand the impact of diversity, scholars have recently argued that it is necessary to 
explore boards as decision-making groups (Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Rindova, 1999; 
Robinson and Dechant, 1997), and that board effectiveness and accountability should be 
evaluated in relation to various aspects of board task performance (Forbes and Milliken, 1999; 
Zahra and Pearce, 1989). Our research question is to explore the effects of women and 
employee-elected board members on board tasks.  In this article we test hypotheses about 
effects of diversity on board control tasks, and we use data from a large scale empirical study 
conducted in Norway. This is an important sample because Norway is particularly interesting 
as Norway has received international attention for innovative approaches for improving board 
composition (Singh and Vinnicombe, 2003a). 
 
Although the argument for board diversity is corporate performance, corporate performance is 
not a direct measure of board effectiveness. Corporate performance is influenced by more 
factors than board demography, and these relationships are still not properly understood 
(Daily, Dalton and Cannella, 2003; Zahra and Pearce, 1989). Furthermore, the research 
studies using demographic measures (such as the existence, number, ratio and critical-levels 
of women or employee directors) as independent variables have led to inconclusive results. 
Some studies report positive relations between women and employee-elected board members 
and company performance (e.g. Catalyst, 2004, 2005; Daily and Dalton, 2003; Erhardt, 
Werbel and Schrader, 2003; Singh, Vinnicombe and Johnson, 2001); while other studies 
report negative or no effects (e.g. Bøhren and Strøm, 2005; Randøy, Thomsen and Oxelheim, 
2006; Rose, 2007).  
 
Potential contributions of employee-elected board members 
The main business case for including employees on corporate boards is their long term 
perspective in decision making (Engelstad and Qvale, 1977; Johnsen, 1998; Jürgens et al., 
2007; Kochan, 2003). Employee directors are more dependent on the long term survival of the 
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firm than shareholders. Furthermore, health, environment and safety issues, and the firm’s 
reputation in the local society are more important to the employee than the other directors. 
Employee-elected directors are also likely to have different backgrounds than other board 
members, and diversity arguments imply that this diversity increases the quality of the 
discussions in the boardroom (Levinson, 2005). In contrast, it is argued that employee-elected 
board members hinder effective board behavior (Bøhren and Strøm, 2005). It has been 
suggested boards will avoid discussing sensitive behavioral control issues, as for example 
management control and compensation, if employee-elected board members are present 
(Hammer, Curral and Stern, 1991; Rose, 2007). Furthermore, employee-elected directors are 
perceived as having insufficient competence to contribute in relation to financial and budget 
control issues (Bøhren and Strøm, 2005). 
 
Employee representation at the board level has been proposed as one mechanism to 
counterbalance the “shareholder supremacy” orientation on boards. It has been argued that 
corporate performance based on ownership control and the supremacy of shareholders leads 
to stock market efficiency. However, other scholars argue the assumption about shareholder 
supremacy is not only flawed, but wrong (Blair, 1995; Blair and Stout, 2001; Grandori, 2004). 
They argue this assumption leads to negative and even disastrous consequences such as 
Enron, Tyco, WorldCom, etc (Ghoshal, 2005; Kochan, 2003). It is in this debate that a 
renewed interest in employee representation at the board level has reappeared.  
 
The renewed interest in employee-elected board members can be connected to the new 
European Union Statute of European Companies and the Council Directive supplementing the 
statue with regard to the involvement of employees. The inclusion of employee-elected 
members on corporate boards is seen as an important feature of a European model of 
corporate governance (Gordon and Roe, 2004). The level of attention to employee-elected 
board members is also rising among both national and European level trade unions (Carly, 
2005; Taylor, 2005). This renewed interest makes it important to understand how employee-
elected board members may contribute to various board tasks and board effectiveness.  
 
Potential contribution of women on corporate boards 
In recent years, there have been increasing pressure from both society (Grosser and Moon, 
2005) and investors to appoint women directors on corporate boards (Burgess and Tharenou, 
2002). As a result, the number of women in top management and board positions has slowly 
increased over the last decade (Burke and Mattis, 2005; Daily, Certo and Dalton, 1999; Singh 
and Vinnicombe, 2003b, 2004). In this article we focus on the diversity argument for 
including women on corporate boards.  It is important to better understand how gender 
diversity contributes to variations in board tasks. However, the argument about gender 
diversity has in some of the literature been disputed as there may be larger differences among 
women and among men than the differences between men and women (Arfken, et al., 2004; 
McCabe, et al., 2006; Ruigrok, et al., 2007). 
 
The main diversity argument for women on corporate boards is that they exert a positive 
impact on tasks of qualitative nature such as strategic and CSR controls (Bilimoria, 2000; 
Rosener, 1990, 1995; Selby, 2000). One criticisms of men is that they focus on money and 
quantifiable issues and less on the human and social aspects of business (Huse and Solberg, 
2006). Women are expected to be more socially-oriented than men, and therefore have the 
potential to broaden discussions on strategic and CSR control issues (Burgess and Tharenou, 
2002; Ibrahim and Angelides, 1994; Williams, 2003).  
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Given the debate as to whether adding women directors increases the diversity of thought in 
boardrooms (Huse and Solberg, 2006) a core question is how women directors contribute to 
board tasks. (Arfken, Bellar and Helms, 2004; McCabe, Ingram and Dato-on, 2006). Our 
main argument is that diversity in backgrounds in board members leads to improved decision-
making (Ruigrok, Peck and Tacheva, 2007).  
 
Need to understand board work 
Some recent qualitative studies have redirected the research question from if women make 
contributions to how they can make contributions (Huse and Solberg, 2006). A more detailed 
knowledge about boardroom behavior is thus required. Recent studies about the 
understanding of board effectiveness have therefore also included measures of boardroom 
discussions (Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Huse, Minichilli and Schøning, 2005; Simons, et al., 
1999). They show positive relations between open and creative boardroom discussions and 
various aspects of board task performance. 
 
Our story is to show the need to go beyond board composition and corporate financial 
performance when exploring the business case contributions of employee-elected and women 
directors. We argue here that their contributions may be explored by taking four steps in 
exploring the black box of actual board behavior (Daily, et al., 2003). The first step is to go 
beyond demographic descriptions of women and employee-elected board members. The 
second step is to explore differences related to various board tasks. The third step is to include 
open discussions in the boardroom as a mediating variable between board member 
characteristics and board control tasks. The fourth step is to show the importance of the 
esteem of the various board members. 
 
Critics of these main streams of studies argue that there is a need to study board effectiveness 
in intermediate steps (Zahra and Pearce, 1989), to consider the board as an open system 
focusing on processes inside and outside the boardroom (Pettigrew, 1992), and to study the 
board as a strategic decision-making group (Forbes and Milliken, 1999). New research 
streams with a focus on actual board behavior are now thus evolving (e.g. Hillman and 
Dalziel, 2003; Huse, 2007; Leblanc and Gillies, 2005; Pye, 2004; Ravasi and Zattoni, 2006; 
Roberts, McNulty and Stiles, 2005; Stiles and Taylor, 2001; Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 
2003). 
 
Board tasks are often grouped into control tasks, service tasks and strategy tasks (Stiles and 
Taylor, 2001; Zahra and Pearce, 1989). Control tasks usually include board tasks done on 
behalf of external actors, service tasks are about what the boards do on behalf of internal 
actors, and strategy tasks will include the boards’ own initiatives to develop a firm (Huse, 
2005, 2007). However, there needs to be even more fine-grained definitions of tasks in order 
to understand the antecedents and consequences of board performance. For example, various 
control tasks are identified in the literature such as strategic controls, behavior controls and 
budget controls (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990; Stiles and Taylor, 2001). CSR control tasks 
have also been identified as managerial or governance tools and have received considerable 
attention in recently developed codes for good corporate governance. Based on insights from 
previous research and the above presentation, we focus below on board involvement in 
different sets of control tasks (Huse, 2007: 247-255).  
• CSR control includes the degree to which boards are involved in meeting CSR 
requirements and stakeholder expectations, including evaluations of health, 
environment and safety; and concerns for the natural environment and corporate social 
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responsibility. Board involvement in contributions to charities was also included in 
this category.  
• Strategic control is decision-making related to major resource allocations. It includes 
assessments of the politics of resources, products and markets. Strategic control will 
have a long-term perspective and often be of a qualitative nature. 
• Behavior control includes evaluations of the performance of the CEO and the top 
management team, CEO compensation, and systems for compensating the top 
management team.  
• Budget control includes evaluating and following up budgets, e.g. cost budgets, 
investment and capital budgets, liquidity and payments, risk management, and sales 
and market budgets. These kinds of controls have often a focus on the past and they 
are typically quantitative. 
 
Creative discussions 
Various studies have highlighted that the working styles of boards (i.e. working structures and 
processes) intermediate the relationship between board member attributes and board task 
performance (Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Huse, 2005; Zahra and Pearce, 1989). Debate, 
creative discussions and involvement in the boardroom are among the team processes that 
have been used as mediators in the understanding of board task performance. The diversity 
arguments rest on expectations that decisions made by groups with diverse knowledge and 
expertise will be higher in quality than those made by persons with homogeneous 
backgrounds; as long as the knowledge and skills of all board members must be used (Forbes 
and Milliken, 1999). Group decision making often fails to use the potential of diversity 
(Brodbeck, Kerschreiter and Schulz-Hardt, 2007). One intermediate measure of whether 
employee-elected and women directors have influenced board performance is the level of 
creativity in board discussions (Simons, Pelled and Smith, 1999). Open and creative 
discussions are key elements in understanding the boards’ working style (Cadbury, 2002; 
Letendre, 2004; Simons et al., 1999). In this study we focus on creative discussions, and we 
expect that creative discussions in the boardroom are mediators between women and 
employee-elected board members, and board control tasks. 
 
The preceding arguments about the need for diversity lead us to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1a: Employee-elected board members have a positive influence on creative 
discussions in the boardroom. 
Hypothesis 1b: Women on corporate boards have a positive influence on creative discussions 
in the boardroom. 
 
Esteem of directors:  the potential contributions of these different types of directors 
Cohesiveness and esteem among the board members have been argued to be critical for 
effective board task performance (Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Huse et al, 2005). Board 
cohesiveness refers to the degree to which board members are attracted to each other and are 
motivated to stay on the board (Forbes and Milliken, 1999: 493). Esteem is about how 
individual board members are perceived and included by the other. Cohesiveness and esteem 
contribute to the use of knowledge and skills of the board members. The actual use of 
knowledge and skills are major board leadership challenges. 
 
The boardroom is often a place for the execution of power, and a power game between 
various groups of board members can take place (Westphal and Milton, 2000). Boards can 
also be an arena where the interests of an inner circle of business elites are addressed (Useem, 
1984). Esteem can be related both to power and the inclusion in an inner circle. Even though 
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all board members have the same responsibility and are equally liable, often some groups of 
board members have higher esteem and power than other board members (Huse, et al., 2005; 
Huse and Solberg, 2006).  
 
We anticipate that the higher the esteem of various groups of board members, the higher 
impact they will have on board tasks. New-comers and persons with alternative backgrounds 
will often have lower esteem. Their voices may not be properly heard, and they become 
‘second class’ members of the board. We therefore expect to find a negative relation between 
the negative esteem of individual or groups of board members and their contributions to board 
control tasks. Based on the above arguments we present the following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 2a: Employee-elected board members have a positive influence on board control 
tasks. 
Hypothesis 2b: Women on corporate boards have a positive influence on board control tasks. 
 
Hypothesis 3a: The esteem of the employee-elected board members is positively related to 
board control tasks. 





We tested our hypotheses through a deductive study based on a unique Norway data set. 
There were three main reasons why we used a Norwegian data set. Boards in Norway have 
one of the highest ratios of women members and a tradition of employee representation. We 
used the Norwegian “Value creating board” survey data about actual board performance (Use, 
2009; Sellevoll, Huse and Hansen, 2007). The advantage of this survey data is that many of 
the concepts and the methods are used and validated in studies across Europe (e.g. Minichilli 
and Hansen, 2007; Pugliese and Wenstøp, 2007; van den Heuvel, van Gils and Voordeckers, 
2006; van Ees, van der Laan and Postma, 2008; Zattoni and Zona, 2007). The questions in 
these surveys were developed in English and translated for specific countries. The response 
rates in the Norwegian surveys were generally as high as 30%. This is considerably higher 
than in the surveys of most of the other countries.  
 
Corporate laws in Norway are similar to those of the other Scandinavian countries. CEO 
duality (that the CEO also is the chairperson) is not allowed, and the employees can elect one-
third of the board members in firms with more than 50 employees. Furthermore, there is a 
compulsory delegation of the daily operation of the firm to a CEO. A two-tier system similar 
to those in Continental Europe exists, but the executive level is generally filled by the CEO 
and not by an executive board. There is also a new law in Norway requiring that 40% of the 
board members in publicly tradable firms shall be of the least represented gender. The 
requirements of this law were not fully met during the spring of 2006. 
 
The variables 
To answer our research questions and to test the hypotheses we used the survey data that was 
collected from ordinary board members and not CEOs or board chairpersons in the respective 
firms. The data were collected during spring 2006 and contained responses from 840 board 
members. In testing the hypotheses, due to the nature of the research questions, we needed to 
limit our sample to firms having both women and employee-elected board members.  
(Insert Table 1 about here) 
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Descriptions of the respondents are found in Table 1. The descriptions may be used as 
indicators of attributes of the board members studied. Several significant differences among 
the respondents exist with respect to age, shareholding, board experiences, competence and 
independence. The largest differences are generally between shareholder- and employee-
elected board members, but on various measures there are also significant differences between 
men and women.  
 
We had full data sets from 384 respondents that were either elected by the shareholders (57%) 
or by the employees (43%).  The construction of the variables is displayed in Table 2. 
(Insert Table 2 about here) 
Board size (number of board members), women directors (ratio) and employee-elected 
directors (ratio) were constructed through count measures. In a subsequent analysis we 
replaced the ratio-measures with the exact numbers of women and employee-elected board 
members. No main differences in the results were found. The different backgrounds and 
knowledge of women and employee-elected directors were measured with three items on a 7-
point Likert-type scale with Cronbach’s alpha of .73 and .80 respectively. Questions about 
women on boards related to their education and experiences, and how they had other 
backgrounds than the male directors. Questions about employee representation related to their 
knowledge on employee attitudes, and activities and operations of the firm. Esteem was 
measured by questions on whether women and employee-elected directors were considered as 
‘second class’ members of the board. These questions were on a 7-point Likert-type scale, and 
the correlation coefficient between the evaluations of women and employee directors were 
.32. Even though only single-item measures were available on esteem, we still decided to use 
it as few studies have explored this variable. 
 
The level of creative discussions in the board was measured with four items on a 7-point 
Likert-type scale (all board members are actively involved in discussions; the board members 
present in meetings provide many creative and innovative suggestions; the board finds 
creative and innovative solutions; board meetings are characterized by creative discussions). 
The Cronbach’s alpha was .81.  
 
Board task performance in studies of actual board behavior is usually measured through the 
boards’ involvement in various tasks (Judge and Zeithaml, 1991; Pearce and Zahra, 
1991).Variables for four sets of control tasks were measured by items on a 7-point Likert-type 
scale, and a confirmatory factor analysis was conducted. CSR control was measured with 
three items (issues about health, environment and safety; issues about the natural environment 
and CSR; issues related to charity). The alpha was .72. Strategic control was measured by 
three items relating to qualitative control (evaluating human resource and recruitment policy; 
evaluating organizational and human resources; evaluating product quality and customer 
satisfaction). The alpha was .82. Behavioral control was measured with three items relating to 
compensation and evaluation of the management (evaluation of CEO behavior; evaluation of 
CEO compensation; evaluation of compensation systems for the top management team). The 
alpha was .80. Budget control was measured with 5 items and the alpha was .89 (evaluation of 
cost budgets; evaluation of investments and capital spending; evaluation of liquidity and 
payments; evaluation of risk management; evaluation of sales- and market budgets). An 
overall control task variable was computed as the mean of the four control task variables. 
 
Two measures about the respondents (if they were women or employee-elected board 
members) were used as control variables. Correlations between the type of respondent and the 
other variables are displayed in Table 3. A woman as respondent is generally found in the 
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boards with the highest number of members and the highest ratio of women. There are 
positive correlations between women as respondents, the “women different” variable and the 
“women low esteem” variable indicating that the women as respondents perceived themselves 
more different than the men perceive them. Women perceived themselves to have lower 
esteem than the male respondent perceived for the women directors. The responding 
employee-elected board members were generally in boards with high ratio of employee-
elected board members. Compared to the responses from the shareholder elected board 
members they answered that the employee-elected board members were more different and 
that they had lower esteem. These differences were larger than the comparable measures from 
the women respondents. It is also displayed in Table 3 that employee-elected board members 
rate the various control tasks lower than the shareholder elected board members.  
 
Analyses 
The nature of our dependent and independent variables allowed the use of multiple linear 
regression analysis to test the hypotheses. Descriptive statistics, including correlation 
coefficients between the variables, are presented in Table 3. 
(Insert Table 3 about here) 
The mean board size was 7.44, the women director ratio was .32 and the employee-elected 
director ratio was .29. Board size is similar to the mean size of the boards of firms listed on 
the Oslo Stock Exchange, while the ratios reflect that only boards with women and employee-
elected members were included in the analyses. Significant skewness was detected in three of 
the variables (women director ratio; employee-elected director ratio; women director esteem). 
Logarithmic transformations of these variables were done. The only correlation coefficient 
among the independent variables higher than .30 was between the esteem of the proportion of 
the women and employee-elected directors. This correlation did not affect the results of the 
linear regression analyses. 
 
The correlation analysis shows that creative discussions are positively related to all the 
various board control tasks, but also that the distinction among the various board control tasks 
is important in relation to some of the independent variables (e.g. board size, women director 
ratio, employee director ratio and the different background and contribution of women 
directors). The highest correlation among the dependent variables was between CSR and 
strategic types of control. Various residual analyses were conducted, but no findings were 
made that influenced the results in the testing of the hypotheses. 
 
FINDINGS 
Results of the multiple linear regression analyses are presented in Table 4. Eleven equations 
are presented. A hierarchical approach was used, and F-changes for each of the steps are 
reported in the bottom of the table. 
(Insert Table 4 about here) 
The first two columns in the table show the equation with the overall control variable as the 
independent variable. Then follow the equations with the CSR control, strategic control, 
behavioral control and budget control. Two equations are presented for each of the board 
control variables – first without, and second with, creative discussions added as a predictor 
variable. The final column shows the equation with creative discussions as the independent 
variable. Using this approach it was possible to test the effects of creative discussions as a 
mediating variable. All the eleven equations are significant. The F-changes when including 
creative discussions are also significant in each equation.  
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The table displays standardized partial regression coefficients. The control variables were 
entered first (steps 1 and 2). The variables characterizing the respondents were significant in 
most of the equations – in particular it had a major impact on the responses whether the 
respondents were elected by the employees. Ratings of the board control tasks were lower 
when the respondents were employee-elected than when they were shareholder elected. 
Furthermore, women rated CSR control lower than the men. Board size was positively related 
to all board control tasks. None of the control variables were significantly related to creative 
discussions. 
 
Hypothesis 1a about a positive influence of employee-elected directors and creative 
discussions in the boardroom was tested by the two variables entered in step 3. The F-change 
was significant. The beta coefficient for employee-elected different was positive and 
significant, while the coefficient for the ratio was insignificant. Hypothesis 1a was 
accordingly supported. Hypothesis 1b about a positive influence of women on corporate 
boards and creative discussions was not supported. The F-change in step 4 was insignificant, 
but there was a positive relationship between the “women different” variable and creative 
discussions.  
 
Hypothesis 2a about a positive influence of employee-elected board members on board 
control tasks was tested by two variables. These were entered in step 3. The F-change for step 
3 was significant in all equations, and the beta coefficients for the employee-elected ratio 
were positive for CSR control and strategic control, but negative for behavior control. 
Hypothesis 2a was thus supported in relation to CSR and strategic types of control, but not in 
relation to behavioral and budget control tasks. Hypothesis 2b about a positive influence of 
women on the board was also tested by two variables. These were entered in step 4. F-change 
for step 4 was insignificant in all the equations. Hypothesis 2b was thus not supported. There 
was, however, a positive relationship between women ratio and board behavior control tasks. 
 
Hypothesis 3 was about positive relations between the esteem of the directors and board 
control tasks. The esteem variables were entered in step 5. The F-change was significant in all 
equations. Table 4 shows support for hypothesis 3a in relation to each of the board task 
measures. Hypothesis 3b about the esteem of women was, however, only supported in relation 
to budget control tasks.  
 
The F-change reported in step 6 shows that creative discussions in the boardroom have 
independent significant effects on the various board control tasks. However, the changes in 
the beta-coefficients between the equations with and without creative discussions, indicate 
how creative discussions may have mediating effects. The most apparent mediating effects are 
between the esteem of the employees and the each of the board control variables. Mediating 




The recent crises in the confidence people have in large corporations gave renewed attention 
to CSR, corporate governance, and the composition and roles of boards of directors. In the 
ensuing CSR debate innovations about the inclusion of women and employee representatives 
on corporate boards have received wide attention. We have in this article contributed to our 
understanding of these issues by exploring boardroom contributions of women and employee-
elected board members. 
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The article has two main particular features. First, we approached the research question 
through studying actual board behavior using various control tasks as our dependent variables. 
Creative boardroom discussions were used as a mediating variable. Second, three sets of 
independent variables about the women and employee-elected directors were used.  The 
different background and the esteem of the women and employee-elected board members 
were used in addition to the ratio of women and employees as explanatory variables. These 
variables helped advance our understanding of how women and employee-elected directors 
may contribute to board effectiveness. We will here present and discuss main findings from 
the study. 
 
The need to understand diversity: Beyond demographics 
A main set of findings is related to our measures of board demographics. Arguments exist that 
there may be larger differences among women in the boardroom than between men and 
women. We have in our study taken such arguments seriously and tried to explore real 
differences. We have focused on diversity through employee-elected and women board 
members, and the results show that it is necessary to go beyond easily measurable 
demographics for understanding the impact of diversity. Our results emphasize the messages 
by Milliken and Martin (1996) and Rindova (1999): namely that backgrounds and experiences 
go beyond gender and external demographics, and that the personalities of the individual 
board members should be considered when researching the implications of diversity. 
 
Then we penetrated the diversity arguments. Our measures of board effectiveness were 
positively influenced when the employee-elected board members were considered to have 
different knowledge and information from the other board members. This shows that the use 
of the particular knowledge and skills of the employee-elected directors should be utilized. 
Such particular knowledge and skills include knowledge about the employees and the firm, 
and, perhaps, skills that pertain to their ability to motivate the employees.  
 
Women are expected to have a more questioning attitude than men, and may thus contribute 
to more open discussions in the boardroom (Kramer, Konrad and Erkut, 2006; Loden, 1987; 
McInerney-Lacombe, Bilimoria and Salipante, 2008). We found that the contribution of 
women to creative discussions only existed when the women had a different background from 
the men. However, this relationship was weak. A possible reason for the lack of strong 
findings may be that, as Rose (2007) has argued, women directors tend to a larger degree than 
the employee directors to adopt the ideas of the conventional board members, and thus do not 
let their potential performance effects materialize. More in-depth studies should explore this 
argument.  
 
Another possible explanation for the lack of impact of women having different backgrounds 
and knowledge might be that their contribution is only discernable through the actual use of 
their alternative backgrounds and expertise. Westphal and Milton (2000), however, found that 
the extent to which minority board members make a contribution to their boards is highly 
dependent on 1) their own previous experience in a minority position of other corporate 
boards; and 2) previous experience by other board members in a minority position. Hence, 
while women directors may bring alternative backgrounds and knowledge to the boardroom, 
they may lack the experience of how to actually present and bring through such knowledge. 
Future research may include more detailed studies of the background of the women directors, 
and should explore how the interaction among womens’ alternative backgrounds, their 
knowledge, and their previous experience as board members may influence their contribution 
to board task performance. 
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The need to understand board work: Tasks and processes 
Another set of findings is that women and employee-elected directors may contribute to board 
effectiveness, but how they contribute to different board tasks may vary. We found positive 
relations between the ratios of women and employee-elected board members and strategic 
types of control as well as between women directors’ ratio and CSR control tasks. The 
relationships with behavioral and budget controls generally were insignificant or negative. 
These results are consistent with previous findings by Tacheva and Huse (2006) that women 
directors are more likely to contribute to board tasks of a qualitative rather than quantitative 
nature. The ratio of employee-elected board members was negatively related to behavioral 
control tasks. We found, however, that employee-elected board members may have 
significant positive effects on other board control tasks, and that this depends on their 
background and their esteem in the board. 
 
A third main set of findings is about the boards’ working style with a focus on creative 
discussions in the boardroom.  The importance of creative discussions and a process-oriented 
boardroom culture is getting increased attention in the conceptual and practitioner-oriented 
literature (Brodbeck, et al., 2007; Huse, et al., 2005; Simons, et al. 1999). The study has 
contributed by including creative discussions into an empirical study. We found that creative 
discussions are significantly related to board control tasks. Creative discussions had effects 
independent of the other predictor variables in the model. The explanatory power of each of 
the equations, indicated by the changes in the adjusted R-squares, increased significantly 
when creative discussions where introduced. However, creative discussions were also 
mediating the relations between our predictor and criteria variables. The most visible 
mediating relations were between the different backgrounds and esteem of the employee-
elected board members and the various board control tasks. To our surprise, as we mentioned 
earlier, we did not find strong evidence that the women directors per se contributed to creative 
discussions. However, the combined effect of different backgrounds and the esteem of the 
women directors were significantly related to creative discussions. Further analyses with 
additional variables and other samples should be undertaken. 
 
The esteem and contribution of women and employee-elected board members 
Finally, we asserted the importance of the esteem of the board members. We expected that the 
higher the esteem the various groups of board members have, the higher the impact they will 
have on board effectiveness. This argument was generally supported in the case of the 
employee-elected directors, and the findings should have practical implications in relations to 
board leadership and the attitudes between shareholder and employee-elected board members. 
In the case of women directors we found that esteem was positively related to budget controls, 
but not to the other types of control. However, the esteem of the women directors was 
generally found to be high and the lack of variations in the data might have caused the lack of 
findings.  
 
Dealing with esteem is a major board leadership challenge (Cadbury, 2002; Huse, 2007; 
Leblanc and Gillies, 2005). Future research should go further into this issue. Few, if any 
empirical studies have used measures about the esteem of board members. Our findings were 
very promising for penetrating into the importance of the esteem, but we only used single-




Three issues about boards’ contributions to CSR have been presented in this article; the 
inclusion of women director, the inclusion of employee-elected directors, and the involvement 
of boards in CSR control tasks. We have tested three sets of hypotheses on how women and 
employee-elected board members may contribute to board effectiveness. Most studies on the 
contribution of women and employee-elected board members have used input-output 
approaches between numbers or ratios of board members and corporate financial 
performance. Findings in these studies have been inconclusive. We used another approach 
and designed a study about actual board behavior, including the exploration of board 
processes and tasks. We found that women and employee-elected board members may 
contribute to board effectiveness. The contribution of women and employee-elected board 
members depended, however, on the use and existence of real diversity and not only 
demographic diversity. The findings revealed that women and employee-elected board 
members may have particular contributions to CSR controls and strategic controls.  
 
Our study contributes to the literature and fills gaps in existing research in several ways 
(Coffey and Wang, 1998; Kochan, 2003). First, it contributes to the ongoing discussion about 
corporate governance innovations with a focus on CSR perspectives. Second, it specificly 
contributes to a better understanding of the contributions of women and employee-elected 
board members. Third, the article contributes to our understanding of diversity and board 
processes in relation to board task involvement. 
 
There are two main practical implications of the study. First, diversity and competencies 
should be important criteria when selecting board members – particularly from a CSR 
perspective. Women and in particular employee-elected board members may contribute to 
board effectiveness, but diversity and competencies do not necessarily follow from gender 
and employee representation. Second, there is a particular board leadership challenge 
involved in developing a board working style where the actual competencies are used. 
 
The study has also implications for further research about diversity in boards of directors. 
There is a need to penetrate board task performance. In addition, studies should go beyond 
easily measurable demographics, and the importance creative discussions and the board 
working style should be explored. We have used a unique data set from Norwegian firms, but 
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Table 1 Descriptions of the respondents 
Mean 
(Standard error mean) 
Standard deviation 
Elected by Gender 
Shareholders Employees Men Women 
Number 247 212 267 186





































Board experiences  






















































Competence and background  




























Extensive relevant company knowledge 













Independence and relationships  




















































Table 2. Validation of the variables 
Variable Operationalization Validation1 
Number of board members Count variable - 
Ratio employee directors Count variable - 
Ratio women directors Count variable - 
Employee-elected directors 
on this board have different 
backgrounds and knowledge 
than shareholder-elected 
directors 
3 items on a 7-point Likert-scale 
a) knowledge about attitudes of employees 
b) knowledge about what takes place in the 
company 
c) to embed board decisions among employees 
Alpha .80 
Women on this board have 
different backgrounds and 
knowledge from the men 
3 items on a 7-point Likert-scale 
a) women different educational background 
b) women different experience background 
c) women represent other values 
Alpha .73 
Esteem of employee-elected 
directors on this board 
One item on a 7-point Likert-scale 
a) employee-elected considered as secondary 
board members 
- 
Esteem of the women 
directors on this board 
One item on a 7-point Likert-scale 
a) women considered as secondary board members 
- 
Creative discussions Four items on a 7-point Likert-scale 
a) creative discussions in the board meetings 
b) all board members contribute actively in the 
discussions 
c) board members presents in meetings creative 
and innovative suggestions 
d) board finds creative and innovative solutions 
Alpha .81 
CSR control: 
(This board is highly involved 
in evaluating) 
Three items on a 7-point Likert-scale 
a) health, environment and safety in the company 
b) the company’s responsibilities towards the 





(This board is highly involved 
in the evaluation of) 
Three items on a 7-point Likert scale 
a) products and customers 
b) human resource and selection policy 
c) organization and human resources 
Alpha .82 
Behavioral control: 
(This board is highly involved 
in evaluating) 
Three items on a 7-point Likert scale 
a) the CEO’s actions and behaviors 
b) compensation for the CEO 
c) TMT compensation systems 
Alpha .80 
Budget control: 
(This board is highly involved 
in evaluating) 
Five items on a 7-point Likert scale 
a) cost budgets 
b) investments and capital expenditures 
c) liquidity and payments 
d) risk management 
e) sales- and marketing budgets 
Alpha .89 
Control tasks (mean) Mean of CSR control, strategic control, behavioral 
control and budget control 
 
1) Validation through confirmatory factor analysis was done on a sample of 840 board 
members selected as shareholder or employee representatives. No CEOs or board 











Table 3. Descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients 
 
N = 371. Pearson’s product moment correlation coefficients. All correlations are presented in decimals. 
Correlations higher than 09 < 10% 2-tailed sign level, 10 < 5% 2-tailed sign level, 13 < 1% 2-tailed sign level 
 Mean Std 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1. Control tasks (mean) 4.44 1.11 -              
2. CSR control 3.82 1.43 .75 -             
3. Strategic control 4.18 1.44 .81 .54 -            
4. Behavioral control 4.30 1.71 .78 .40 .46 -           
5. Budget control 5.45 1.24 .71 .35 .49 .41 -          
6. Empl.-elected respondent  .45 .50 -.37 -.25 -.33 -.34 -.18 -         
7. Woman as respondent .44 .50 .00 -.05 -.03 .05 .02 -.03 -        
8. # board members 7.44 2.03 .26 .22 .14 .31 .10 -.06 .10 -       
9. Employee ratio (ln) -.24 .35 -.09 .02 -.00 -.20 -.06 .21 -.02 -.09 -      
10. Employee dir. different 4.96 1.28 .08 .08 .05 .05 .08 .21 -.03 .09 .03 -     
11. Women ratio (ln)  .24 .42 .13 .06 .05 .20 .05 -.11 .25 .26 -.10 .03 -    
12. Women dir. different 3.95 1.39 -.03 .01 -.02 -.08 .01 .01 .12 -.12 .02 .02 -.01 -   
13. Employee low esteem 2.88 1.92 -.37 -.25 -.29 -.29 -.29 .28 .12 -.08 .11 -.16 .02 .11 -  
14. Women low esteem (ln) 1.45 .62 -.21 -.10 -.18 -.15 -.23 .10 -.16 -.11 -.02 .19 -.01 .19 .38 - 









Table 4. Linear regression analysis 









Budget control Creative 
Discus. 
Equation I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI 
Step 1            
Employee respondent -.30** -.28** -.24** -.22 -.30** -.29** -.26** -.24** -.12’ -.09 -.07 
Woman respondent -.00 -.01 .-07 .07 -.01 -.02 .02 .01 .05 .04 .02 
 
Step 2 
           
Board size .21** .22** .21** .22** .11* .12* .24** .26** .05 .07 .04 
 
Step 3 
           
Employee-elected ratio .02 .01 .10* .10* .08 .07 -.10* -.10* -.02 -.02 .01 
Employee-elected 
different 
.08’ .00 .09’ .02 .06 .01 .06 -.01 .06 -.02 .21** 
 
Step 4 
           
Women director ratio .05 .05 .01 .01 -.00 .00 .09’ .09* .01 .02 -.01 
Women director different .03 -.02 .05 .02 .03 -.01 -.03 -.06 .05 .01 .09’ 
 
Step 5 
           
Employee low esteem -.24** -.10* -.18** -.08 -.18** -.08 -.15** -.06 -.20** -.09 -.20** 
Women low esteem -.06 -.04 .03 .05 -.07 -.05 -.04 -.02 -.15** -.13** -.06 
 
Step 6 
           
Creative discussions  .43**  .33**  .30**  .32**  .38**  
            
R .52 .65 .40 .50 .42 .50 .50 .58 .36 .49 .42 
Adj R-square .26 .41 .14 .23 .16 .23 .24 .32 .11 .22 .16 
F 15.2** 26.6** 7.7** 11.9** 8.9** 12.2** 13.8** 18.6** 6.0** 11.8** 8.7** 
F change step 1  29.1**  13.6**  23.6**  23.9**  6.6** 2.4’ 
F change step 2  26.8**  18.3**  6.4*  40.2**  2.9’ .00 
F change step 3  4.5**  4.49*  3.3*  4.8**  2.9’ 15.2** 
F change step 4  .20  .39  .02  2.1  .01 .66 
F change step 5  14.8**  5.27**  8.2**  5.9**  15.0** 19.1** 
F change step 6  94.4**  42.5**  34.1**  46.1**  56.6**  
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